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Abstract
We present a model of efficient contracting with endogenous matching and
limited monitoring in which firms compete for CEOs. The model explains the
association between limited monitoring and CEO pay practices such as pay-for-
luck, high salaries, a low pay-performance sensitivity, and a more asymmetric
pay-for-performance relation. The results are driven by the matching equilib-
rium: firms with different capacities for monitoring hire different types of CEOs
and offer different compensation contracts. The model thus responds to some
fundamental arguments of the managerial power perspective.
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In recent years, CEO pay has attracted considerable attention, both in the popular
press and in academic journals. This renewed interest was in part triggered by some
puzzling observations such as the evidence that CEOs are paid for luck (Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001)). Based on these observations, Bertrand and Mullainathan
(2001) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003), among others, argue that the optimal contracting
approach fails. Their argument is based not so much on the existence of phenomena
such as pay-for-luck – some of which have been explained, see for example the literature
review of Edmans and Gabaix (2009) – but on the fact that their extent is greater in
firms with worse governance. Specifically, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that
pay-for-luck is more widespread in firms with worse monitoring or governance, while
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that CEO pay will be higher and less sensitive to
performance in this type of firm, a statement for which there is some empirical evidence
(e.g. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Hartzell and Starks (2003)). These
observations have contributed to the development of an alternative paradigm of CEO
compensation, the “managerial power” or “skimming” approach.
We show in this paper that these observations are actually consistent with a model
of optimal contracting, once limited monitoring and endogenous matching between
CEOs and firms are taken into consideration. Our theoretical model of optimal con-
tracting explains the association between poor monitoring and CEO pay practices such
as pay-for-luck, high salaries, a low sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance, and
a more asymmetric pay-for-performance relation. The main reason behind these re-
sults is the equilibrium matching between CEOs and firms: different types of firms
hire different types of CEOs, and therefore offer different contracts. The paper thus
brings a theoretical response to some as yet unchallenged fundamental arguments of
the managerial power theory.
The model is a two-period setting in which firms hire, compensate, and fire CEOs.
The ability of CEOs is uncertain and unknown to all parties, and the variance of
ability differs across CEOs. For example, the variance of ability would tend to be
lower for CEOs who are older, with a longer tenure at the firm, who have a specific
degree (e.g., MBA), who possess prior industry-specific experience and management
experience. Firm performance in the first period provides information about the ability
of its CEO, so that it affects the CEO’s second period outside option. As in career
concerns models (e.g., Harris and Holmstrom (1982)), a CEO’s outside option depends
on the market’s updated belief about his ability. The outside option also depends on
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the transferability of CEO ability across firms, and on business conditions or “luck” (as
in Oyer (2004)). In this setting, the compensation contracts are designed to match the
state-contingent outside options of CEOs, as determined in a market equilibrium. We
also assume that firms are heterogeneous and differ in their ownership structure. As
in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), more concentrated ownership leads to more
extensive monitoring of the CEO. Monitoring generates signals on CEO ability, which
facilitates CEO dismissal (Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist (2013)).1 We determine
the optimal matching between CEOs and firms – firms with better monitoring are
matched with CEOs with more uncertain ability – and derive the optimal contracts
resulting from the matching equilibrium.
We now list a series of associations derived in the model between the intensity of
monitoring and CEO pay practices, which are consistent with the empirical facts often
presented by the managerial power theory as evidence of the failure of the optimal
contracting paradigm. First, the model explains the important finding in Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001) that “pay for luck diminishes with the presence of a large
shareholder.” Indeed, firms with concentrated ownership and the associated greater
monitoring capacity are more willing to hire CEOs whose ability is more uncertain
ex-ante. Since firm performance is driven by CEO ability, noise, and luck, firm per-
formance is more informative about CEO ability when this ability is more uncertain
ex-ante. It follows that second-period state-contingent pay puts a higher weight on
first-period firm performance net of luck for CEOs whose ability is less precisely es-
timated ex-ante. Thus, because of the endogenous matching of CEOs and firms, the
model predicts less pay-for-luck in firms with more concentrated ownership and better
monitoring.2
Second, the model can explain that CEOs in firms with less concentrated ownership
are paid higher salaries (see Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), and Hartzell and
Starks (2003)). When managerial skills are sufficiently transferable across firms and
CEO dismissal is sufficiently costly, CEOs with a more precisely estimated ability
1In Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009), CEO entrenchment is driven by the cost associated to CEO
turnover. In their model, CEOs set their own pay subject to a limited entrenchment constraint. In
our model, “entrenchment” is driven by the limited monitoring capacity of the firm’s shareholders, so
that the firm optimally sets CEO pay and dismisses the CEO subject to limited monitoring.
2The logic of the result is reminiscent of Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) who show in the context
of sharecropping contracts that endogenous matching can explain apparent discrepancies between
theoretical predictions and empirical findings.
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are more valuable and therefore receive higher salaries.3 Intuitively, because of the
competition among firms and of the transferability of managerial skills, CEOs capture
most of the gains associated with a good first-period performance. In addition, firms
can be stuck with bad CEOs when CEO dismissal is costly – which is all the more likely
when CEO ability is more uncertain. The result then follows from the equilibrium
matching, given that CEOs with more precisely estimated ability are matched with
firms with less concentrated ownership and worse monitoring.
Third, the model can explain the link between institutional ownership concentration
and pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) (Hartzell and Starks (2003)), to the extent
that the concentration of institutional investors is positively related to the monitoring
intensity. The reason is again that the first-period performance is more informative
about CEO ability when ability is less precisely estimated ex-ante. In this case, the
sensitivity of pay to performance must be higher to match the outside option. But
this type of CEO is matched with a firm with a greater capacity for monitoring. Once
again, monitoring capacity affects the PPS via the matching between CEOs and firms,
even though it does not have any direct effect on the PPS. The model can also explain
that poor CEO performance is punished more harshly (by lower pay) in firms with a
larger institutional investor base (Bell and Van Reenen (2013)).4 Indeed, when CEOs
with a more precisely estimated ability – who are matched with firms with a lower
capacity for monitoring – earn a higher salary, their pay is sensitive to their outside
option for a smaller range of poor performances.
Another major contribution of the paper is to analyze the effects of changes in
monitoring capacity on CEO pay. We show that an improvement in monitoring capac-
ity, whether across the board or confined to the subset of badly governed firms, has
spillover effects that increase CEO pay in all firms, including those whose monitoring
capacity is unchanged.5 In the model, monitoring heterogeneity softens competition
3By contrast, in Hermalin (2005) retention is not an issue and dismissal is costless, so the firm
always values uncertainty about the CEO’s ability. In addition, Hermalin (2005) does not distinguish
between the different components of CEO pay, so that his analysis only considers total CEO pay.
4Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013) argue that institutional investors are better at monitor-
ing CEOs, while Hartzell and Starks (2003) argue that these institutions “serve a monitoring role”,
and reference a number of other studies that support this conclusion.
5This effect is related to the work of Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012), who show that
corporate governance in a firm may generate an externality and influence the compensation of CEOs
in other firms. Note that the externality that we identify does not affect Pareto efficiency and therefore
does not call for a regulatory intervention.
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for CEOs, and enables well-governed firms to earn rents. Better monitoring improves
the CEOs’ bargaining position and reduces these rents. The facts that CEO pay in-
creased and corporate governance improved in the past decades (Huson, Parrino, and
Starks (2001)), notably via the diffusion of best practices, are hard to reconcile with
the managerial power theory but are consistent with our model. We also find that a
firm-specific change in monitoring capacity does not necessarily have an effect on CEO
turnover (because of a sorting effect), and it does not affect CEO pay. This is contrary
to what the managerial power theory would predict,6 but our results are in line with
the evidence in Kaplan and Minton (2012) and Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012),
respectively. This distinction between the effects of economy-wide and firm-specific
changes in monitoring or governance should be considered in future empirical studies.
Other predictions of the model are also consistent with the empirical evidence on
CEO compensation. As in Harris and Holmstrom (1982), risk neutral firms insure risk
averse CEOs against negative updating on their ability. CEO pay is thus downward
rigid (consistent with the empirical evidence in Taylor (2013)). This rigidity explains
the absence of financial punishment for poor performance and asymmetric pay-for-luck
(the fact that CEO pay is less sensitive to bad luck is documented in Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) and Garvey and Milbourn (2006)). In addition, if firm value
is multiplicative in the CEO ability and the luck shock (as in Gabaix and Landier
(2008)), then the value of the CEO’s outside option is shown to be linear in a measure
of firm value that does not fully filter out luck. This is in contrast with principal-agent
models of effort provision with risk averse CEOs, in which such linearity is elusive
(e.g., Dittmann and Maug (2007), Edmans and Gabaix (2011b)). In our model, a
positive shock to either CEO ability or business conditions raises both firm value and
the market value of the CEO – but only to the extent that CEO ability is transferable
across firms. In that regard, the rise of stock-options based compensation in the 1980s
and the 1990s, as general managerial skills became relatively more important than
firm-specific skills (Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2007)), is consistent
with the implications of the model.
The assumption at the core of our analysis that retention is an important deter-
minant of CEO compensation has been tested in the literature. Gabaix and Landier
6In the managerial power model of Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009), a CEO who gets more “entrenched”
is paid more, ceteris paribus. Note that in Hermalin (2005) there is no sorting effect. In his model,
an increase in monitoring capacity reduces CEO utility – which in turn requires an increase in CEO
pay – and it increases CEO turnover.
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(2008) find strong empirical support for a model in which the level of CEO pay is jointly
determined in a competitive market by the distribution of CEO talent and firm size (see
also Tervio (2008) and Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2012)). Lazear (2004) and Oyer and
Schaefer (2005) emphasize the limitations of the incentives-based explanation for the
adoption of variable pay and broad-based stock-options plans, respectively, although
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) argue that adding a moral hazard dimension to a
competitive assignment model can explain the level of observed CEO PPS and the rela-
tion with firm size. Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) present evidence that CEO
pay is structured to match the state-contingent outside employment opportunities of
managers. Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) find that a competitive assignment model can
explain a number of patterns related to CEO turnover. The present paper contributes
to this growing literature which shows that both the level and the form of CEO pay
can be explained by retention motives and changes in reservation wages. In particu-
lar, our results contrast with the arguments that it is inefficient to use equity-based
compensation for retention purposes (Hall and Murphy (2003), Lazear (2004)).7
Section 1 presents the model. Section 2 derives the optimal compensation contract,
for any given firm-manager match. Section 3 describes the matching equilibrium and
presents the main results of the paper. Section 4 discusses some empirical implications
of the results. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1 The model
1.1 Environment
The model builds on the career concerns models of Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and
Beaudry and di Nardo (1991). We consider a two-period economy in which firms
compete for CEOs. In both periods, the gross profits of a firm (before compensation
of the CEO) depend on three factors: the CEO’s ability a˜, business conditions L˜, and
an idiosyncratic shock ˜t. The gross profits in period t, for t ∈ {1, 2}, are realized at
7According to Lazear (2004), “Worker retention is not a justification for awarding non-vested stock
options (. . . ) To the extent that the typical worker is more risk-averse than the outside suppliers of
capital, non-vested pay should take the form of bonds rather than equity.” According to Hall and
Murphy (2003), “Options clearly provide retention incentives, but do they do so in the most efficient
manner? (. . . ) it is not obvious to us that retention incentives should optimally vary with company
stock prices.”
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the end of the period and take the following form:
pit = (α + sta+ t)L. (1)
The multiplicative specification relies on Gabaix and Landier (2008), who show that
the dollar effect of CEO “talent” on firm value is increasing in firm value, and that
the data is consistent with constant returns to scale. A notable implication is that an
exogenous shock to business conditions (L) also affects the value to the firm of CEO
ability.8
We assume that ˜t is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ
2
 , and
is independent from other random variables; L˜ is a random variable with positive
support and c.d.f. G (·), which is normalized so that E[L˜] = 1. Let L˜ denote the
random variable L˜, and L its realization at the end of period 1. Note that L affects
firm profits in periods 1 and 2. We assume that L is observable and contractible. We
refer to L as “luck”, since it represents a shock that is not under the control of the
CEO but that nevertheless has an effect on firm value.
The variable st represents the accumulated experience and firm-specific skills of the
CEO. Following Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), we let st = 1 if the CEO worked for
the firm in period t − 1, and st = γ ∈ (0, 1) otherwise. This means that s1 = γ, and
s2 = 1 if the CEO stays in the same firm, and s2 = γ in case of CEO turnover. The
evidence in Taylor (2013) is consistent with the assumption that managerial skills are
not fully transferable across firms, that is, γ < 1. If general skills predominate, then
s approaches one: managerial skills are easily transferable, and CEOs are easier to
replace.
The ability a˜ of a CEO is normally distributed with mean a¯ > 0 and variance σ2a.
It is initially unknown to the firm and to the CEO. CEOs are risk averse with utility
function u (·), with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. We assume a limited supply of CEOs. Firms
without CEOs can be run by managers, whose ability is normalized to zero.9 There is
an infinite supply of such managers.
Firm net profits are the gross profits (henceforth “profits”) net of compensation
8The “luck” shocks considered in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), are observable shocks “that
a CEO does not influence” through his actions, for example mean industry performance. This is
consistent with our specification.
9The ability of managers could also be random, but this would not affect the main results. This
formulation simplifies the algebra. It also implies that managers do not accumulate firm-specific skills.
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costs. Both gross profits and net profits are observable and contractible. For simplicity,
we assume a zero interest rate and no time discounting. Firms pay out their net profits
realized over both periods to shareholders at the end of the second period.
We assume that a firm can commit to a long-term contract, but a CEO cannot.
While firms can propose enforceable long-term contracts to their employees, constraints
on involuntary servitude prevent employees from forgoing the option to quit a job.
This one-sided-commitment assumption was introduced first in Harris and Holmstrom
(1982). We also assume that CEOs can neither save nor borrow; they cannot transfer
income from one period to another.10 Two types of contracts are feasible: spot contracts
and long-term contracts. In case of a spot contract, the employment of the first period
CEO terminates at the end of the first period. A long-term contract specifies the wage
that the firm commits itself to pay the CEO in both periods.
1.2 Governance and monitoring
As in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), a fraction δ ∈ (0, 1] of shares is held
by a single shareholder, while a fraction 1 − δ is dispersed among a continuum of
small shareholders.11 Shareholders are risk neutral, and their objective is to maximize
expected profits. Each shareholder can exert a nonverifiable monitoring effort e ∈ [0, 1]
at a cost c e
2
2
during the first period. As in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), monitoring
effort increases the probability that the shareholder receives a private signal on CEO
ability. Specifically, with probability e, the shareholder receives the following signal:
y = α + a+ t (2)
and with probability 1− e, he receives no signal. The signal can be shared with other
shareholders who then decide whether or not to dismiss its CEO before the end of the
first period.12 The cost of dismissal is denoted by K ≥ 0; the parameter K represents
10As in Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), the optimal contract
is such that the saving restriction is inconsequential.
11In the words of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), “Shleifer and Vishny (1986), among others,
argue that large shareholders improve governance in a firm. A single investor who holds a large block
of shares in a firm will have greater incentives to watch over the firm than a dispersed group of small
shareholders.”
12These assumptions parsimoniously capture the notion that monitoring facilitates the assessment
of CEO ability and CEO dismissal – before publicly observable measures of performances are realized.
They also allow to avoid asymmetric information on the market for CEOs at the beginning of the
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the cost of involuntary CEO turnover. After dismissing its CEO, a firm hires a new
CEO (or manager) on the spot market.
The analysis of the model proceeds in two steps. In section 2, we solve for optimal
contracts for a given match of firms and CEOs. In section 3, we derive the equilibrium
matching of firms and CEOs with the reservation utilities at the beginning of the first
period determined in equilibrium.
2 Optimal contracts
Consider a firm with a shareholder owning a fraction δ of the shares and a CEO with
variance of ability σ2a and reservation utility over both periods denoted by U¯ . We first
derive the CEO’s outside option in the second period, after beliefs about his ability
have been updated, and then solve backwards for the optimal contract in the first
period.
2.1 Spot market in period 2
After observing first-period profits pi1 and the luck shock L, firms use Bayes’ rule to
update their belief about the CEO’s expected ability aˆ:
aˆ =
1
γ
γ2σ2a(pi1/L− α) + σ2γa¯
γ2σ2a + σ
2

. (3)
In the second period, a firm can hire a manager with zero ability on a spot contract
for a zero wage, in which case its expected profits are αL. Firms can also compete for a
CEO with updated expected ability aˆ. All other firms with vacant positions are willing
to pay up to γaˆL to hire this CEO, which corresponds to the additional expected profits
generated by a given CEO relative to a zero-ability manager. Competition between
firms drives the second period reservation wage to W2(aˆ, L) = γaˆL. Because of one-
sided commitment, a CEO with expected ability aˆ can earn this wage in the second
period, whether he entered a spot contract or a long-term contract in the first period.
It follows that a firm that employed a CEO in the first period needs to match this
reservation wage to retain him. Because of the imperfect transferability of managerial
second period, which is an interesting but separate issue that would markedly complicate the model
without qualitatively affecting the main results.
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skills, the market value of CEOs does not fully adjust to ability or luck shocks: any
given firm would be willing to pay up to aˆL to retain its CEO in the second period.
2.2 Monitoring and dismissals
Consider a firm that hired a CEO under a long-term contract. The firm optimally
dismisses its CEO when it receives a signal on his ability and this signal is lower than
a threshold.
First, consider the case in which shareholders do not receive a signal. The expected
second period profits of a given firm that does not dismiss its CEO are:
(α + E[a˜])E[L˜]− w2, (4)
where w2 denotes the (as yet undetermined) compensation promised to the CEO in the
second period. The expected second period profits of the firm if it dismisses its CEO
and hires either a new CEO or a manager on the spot market at the beginning of the
second period are:
αE[L˜]−K − w2, (5)
where w2 is again the contractual second period compensation of the initial CEO. Given
that E[a˜] = a¯, E[L˜] = 1, comparing the expressions in (4) and (5) yields the optimal
firing rule: a firm will dismiss its CEO before the end of the first period if and only if
a¯ < −K. (6)
This condition is never satisfied given that a¯ > 0.
Second, consider a firm that receives a signal on CEO ability in the first period. As
above, its expected second period profits if it does not dismiss its CEO are:
(α + E[a˜|y])E[L˜|y]− w2. (7)
Likewise, the expected second period profits of a firm which dismisses its CEO are:
αE[L˜|y]−K − w2. (8)
Given that L and y are independent and E[L˜] = 1, and comparing the expressions in
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(7) and (8) yields the optimal firing rule: a firm will dismiss its CEO before the end of
the first period if and only if
E[a˜|y] < −K. (9)
In summary:
Lemma 1. A firm that does not receive a signal on its CEO’s ability does not dismiss
its CEO. A firm that receives a signal y dismisses its CEO if and only if E[a˜|y]< −K.
Dismissing a CEO under a long-term contract is optimal if the updated expected
ability of the CEO in place is lower than a threshold. This threshold is decreasing in
the cost of dismissal K. Given that a firm that receives no signal retains its CEO, some
CEOs with low ability remain in place. Monitoring effort increases the probability to
receive a signal, so that firms that monitor more tend to dismiss their CEOs more
often.
Shareholders use a cost-benefit analysis to choose the monitoring intensity. Due
to free riding by small shareholders,13 only the large shareholder incurs the cost of
monitoring. Since he is risk neutral, the benefit of monitoring is increasing linearly in
δi, while the cost of monitoring is independent of δi.
Denoting by ϕ the p.d.f. of a˜, and by φ the p.d.f. of the signal y˜, the problem of
the shareholder is
max
e
δ
[
e
∫ ∞
−∞
(∫ −K
−∞
−Kφ(y|x)dy +
∫ ∞
−K
xφ(y|x)dy
)
ϕ(x)dx+ (1− e)E[a˜]
]
− ce
2
2
(10)
The expected benefit of successful monitoring is
M(K, σ2a) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)φ(y|x)ϕ(x)dydx =
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x) ϕˆ(x)dx.
where ϕˆ denotes the density of the distribution of the updated CEO ability before y is
observed. Simple algebra shows that this is the density of a normal distribution with
13Note that the nonverifiability of the monitoring effort prevents shareholders from sharing the cost
of monitoring. With a continuum 1−δi of other shareholders, this could alternatively be microfounded
by assuming an arbitrarily small transaction cost.
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mean a¯ and variance σ
2
a
σ2a+σ
2
ε
σ2a. Thus, the problem in (10) reduces to:
max
e
δieM(K, σ
2
a)− c
e2
2
To ensure an interior solution, we assume that c > M(K, σ2a). Given that the problem
is globally concave, the first-order condition is necessary and sufficient.
Lemma 2. The monitoring effort is e∗ = δiM(K, σ2a)/c. It is strictly increasing in
the stake δi of the shareholder and in the variance of CEO ability, σ
2
a.
2.3 The optimal long-term contract
A long-term contract consists in a first-period wage w1 and a second period wage
w2(aˆ, L) contingent on the observed variables L and aˆ (through pi1). The optimal
contract minimizes total expected compensation subject to two types of participation
constraints. The state-contingent participation constraints guarantee that the second
period contractual wage is at least as high as the reservation wage of the CEO. The first-
period participation constraint guarantees that the expected utility associated with the
two-period contract is as high as the CEO’s reservation utility over two periods, U¯ .
As seen before, given that it only depends on the information on CEO ability
received at the end of the first period, the dismissal decision is independent of the
contract. The dismissal cost in turn does not affect the optimal long-term contract.14
In the remainder of the paper, we assume that the expected dismissal cost is not too
large, so that the optimal long-term contract dominates a sequence of spot contracts.15
The optimal long-term contract solves:
min
〈w1,w2(aˆ,L)〉
w1 + E
[
w2(aˆ, L)
]
(11)
subject to w2(aˆ, L) ≥ W2(aˆ, L) = γaˆL for all aˆ, L (12)
14A firm dismisses its CEO if and only if aˆ < −K. The participation constraint (12) is binding only
when aˆ ≥ w∗1γL ≥ 0. But in cases when the firm dismisses its CEO, aˆ is negative so that (12) cannot be
binding. It follows that the dismissal decision does not affect the contract.
15This assumption can be microfounded by assuming that σ2a and K are sufficiently low.
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u (w1) + E[u (w2(aˆ, L))] ≥ U¯ . (13)
Lemma 3. The optimal long-term contract is characterized by a first period wage of w∗1
and a second period wage of:
w?2(aˆ, L) = max{w∗1, γaˆL}. (14)
The value of w∗1 is determined by the first period participation constraint, and depends
on the value of the outside option U¯ .
A long term contract is fully characterized by the first-period wage w∗1. The second
period wage is either equal to w∗1 or adjusts to match the reservation wage W2 (aˆ, L),
when W2 (aˆ, L) is larger than w
∗
1. As in Harris and Holmstrom (1982), the risk averse
CEO gets partial insurance: should his second period reservation wage fall below w∗1,
the firm nevertheless pays w∗1 in the second period. In this case, this payment either
takes the form of a fixed wage, or of a severance payment, in case the CEO is dis-
missed. Thus, because of the CEO’s risk aversion and of the ability of the firm to
commit, it is inefficient to punish the CEO for “failure”. To summarize, the optimal
contract features downside protection for insurance purposes, and upside participation
for retention purposes.
Even though firing a CEO is costly, there is no rent extraction in equilibrium.
Indeed, the first period wage w∗1 adjusts so that the CEO is at his reservation level
of utility. Intuitively, the CEO pays an insurance premium in the first period, which
brings w∗1 to a lower level than what the CEO would get on the spot market. Our
models thus differs on that dimension from Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009), where firing
costs make rent extraction possible. In addition, the CEO is less exposed to risk with
this long-term contract than he would be with a sequence of spot contract because of
the embedded insurance. Here our results differ from Oyer’s (2004). In Oyer, there is
a trade-off between exposing the CEO to risk (by indexing his pay on some variable
which is imperfectly correlated with his reservation wage) and incurring renegotiation
or transactions costs with interim re-contracting. We also differ from standard models
of moral hazard, where the optimal contract trades-off incentives for effort and risk-
sharing.
The optimal contract can be implemented in two different ways – this does not
13
matter for our subsequent results.16 First, the firm can simply commit to paying the
CEO the fixed wage w∗1 in the first and second periods, and adjust upward CEO pay ex-
post (at the beginning of the second period) in cases when W2(aˆ, L) > w
∗
1, as specified
in (14). Indeed, this will be ex-post optimal for retention purposes. Second, at the
beginning of the first period, the firm can offer the CEO an explicit long-term contract
based on indexed firm value, as described in the next paragraph.
We now show that the optimal second-period compensation of the CEO can be
expressed as a function of firm value and the luck shock. In a competitive market for
firm shares with risk neutral shareholders, firm value at the beginning of the second
period is:
V = pi1 − w1 + E[pi2|pi1, L]− w2(aˆ, L) = pi1 − w∗1 + (α + aˆ)L−max{w∗1, γaˆL}, (15)
if a signal y is received by the shareholder and E[a˜|y] > −K. Otherwise, the initial
CEO is dismissed at the beginning of the second period, with a compensating payment
of w∗1, while the new CEO receives a fixed wage, so that firm value does not matter for
compensation purposes. Substituting for pi1 = V + w
∗
1 − (α + aˆ)L + max{w∗1, γaˆL} in
(3) and isolating aˆ, we get:
w?2(aˆ, L) = w
∗
1 if γaˆL ≤ w∗1,
w?2(aˆ, L) = γaˆL =
(
γ2σ2a + σ
2

γ2σ2a
+
1− γ
γ
)−1(
V + w∗1 − 2αL+ γa¯L
σ2
γ2σ2a
)
otherwise.
That is,
w?2(aˆ, L) = max{w∗1, ψ(w∗1 + V + ηL)}, (16)
where ψ ≡
(
γ2σ2a + σ
2

γ2σ2a
+
1− γ
γ
)−1
and η ≡ γa¯ σ
2

γ2σ2a
− 2α. (17)
The optimal contract described in Lemma 3 can be implemented by making CEO pay
in the second period contingent upon the measure P (V, L) = V + ηL. Indeed, the
16In particular, the results in Proposition 1 hold in any case, as the factors at play in (18) are by
construction the same as in (14). Note that the explicit contract described in the following paragraphs
would strictly dominate the ex-post adjustement described in this paragraph with a renegotiation cost,
no matter how small. By contrast, in Oyer (2004), with an arbitrarily small renegotiation cost, it
would be optimal to use spot contracts and renegotiation instead of explicit long-term contracts.
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state-contingent payment w?2(aˆ, L) in (14) can be expressed as
w?2(aˆ, L) = max{w∗1, ψw∗1 + ψP (V, L)}. (18)
We conclude that the optimal state-contingent payment may be implemented with a
fixed wage of w∗1 in the first and second periods, and indexed stock-options based on
P with exercise price κ =
w∗1(1−ψ)
ψ
which vest at the beginning of the second period.
We now summarize notable features of the optimal contract:
Proposition 1. The compensation contract has the following characteristics:
(i) The sensitivity of the performance measure to luck is increasing in the variance
of the idiosyncratic shock ˜: dη
dσ2
> 0.
(ii) The sensitivity of the performance measure to luck is decreasing in the variance
of the CEO’s ability: dη
dσ2a
< 0.
(iii) The contract displays asymmetric pay-for-luck.
(iv) The sensitivity of pay to performance is increasing in the relative importance
of general managerial skills: dψ
dγ
> 0.
As in Oyer (2004), the compensation of the CEO in the second period depends on
business conditions, or “luck” (L): d
dL
P (V, L) 6= 0. Compensation adjusts to the level
required to retain the CEO, and this level depends on business conditions. The degree
of pay-for-luck relative to pay-for-performance (which is essentially pay-for-ability), as
measured by η, is increasing in σ2 and decreasing in σ
2
a: there is more pay-for-luck
relative to pay-for-performance when firm value V is a noisy measure of CEO ability a,
and when the initial uncertainty on the ability of the CEO is low. This suggests that
pay-for-luck is stronger for old CEOs or CEOs with a long tenure (with low σ2a), and
that young CEOs or CEOs with a short tenure (with high σ2a) should be less paid for
luck. In the limit, as the ratio σ
2

σ2a
tends to infinity, η also tends to infinity, and state-
contingent remuneration only depends on luck. In addition, the CEO is “rewarded
for good luck”, but he is not symmetrically “penalized for bad luck”: pay-for-luck is
asymmetric. This is due to the insurance provided to risk averse CEOs.
The sensitivity of CEO pay to performance, as measured by ψ, is increasing in the
relative importance of general managerial skills (γ). An increase in γ means that CEOs
are more transferable across firms. The sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm value
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and luck must then increase in order to match the reservation wages of CEOs state-
by-state. To the extent that general skills became progressively more important in the
1980s and the 1990s, as argued by Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2007),
then the model explains why CEOs received increasing amounts of stock-options over
this period (Frydman and Jenter (2010), figure 2). This prediction is also consistent
with the evidence in Cunat and Guadalupe (2009) that stronger international competi-
tion – which in their words “could be an additional reason why general skills are more
important” – is associated with more performance-related pay. Finally, this prediction
may explain the finding in Murphy (2012) that non-U.S. CEOs do not receive as much
equity-based pay as U.S. CEOs. Indeed, skills might be relatively less transferable in
countries which are comparatively small and not Anglophone.
3 Competition for CEOs and matching equilibrium
In section 2, we derived the optimal contract with exogenous reservation utilities U¯ .
We now introduce competition between firms to endogenize the CEOs’ first-period
reservation utilities. We also extend the model to incorporate matching between CEOs
and firms, in order to study the link between monitoring and CEO pay practices.17 We
do not model the competitive process explicitly, but we identify the stable matching
between firms and CEOs.
3.1 A matching model of CEOs and firms
We now assume that firms differ in their monitoring capacity, because of differences
in ownership structures. A firm i with a large outside shareholder (high δi) has more
incentives to monitor the CEO to get information about his ability and dismiss him if
necessary. We also assume that the variance of ex-ante ability σ2a differs across CEOs.
As in the baseline model, there are no information asymmetries: for any given CEO,
the value of σ2a is common knowledge, but neither the firms nor the CEO observe a.
We denote by Af = {δ1, δ2, ..., δn} the set of firms with δ1 > δ2 > ... > δn. Likewise,
we denote by Ac = {σ21, σ22, ..., σ2l , σ2l+1, ..., σ2p} the set of l CEOs, with E[a˜] = a¯ and
17Other matching models between managers and firms in the CEO compensation literature include
Gabaix and Landier (2008), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), Acharya, Gabarro, and Volpin
(2011), Edmans and Gabaix (2011a), Bandiera, Guiso, Prat, and Sadun (2012), and Eisfeldt and
Kuhnen (2013).
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σ21 > σ
2
2 > ... > σ
2
l , and p − l managers, with a = 0 and σ2k = 0 for k ≥ l + 1, where
l < n < p− l. We thus assume that CEOs are on the short side of the market.
Following Roth and Sotomayor (1989), the matching process can be defined as a
matching function µ : Af ∪ Ac → Af ∪ Ac such that µ (δi) ∈ Ac ∪ {δi} for all δi,
µ (σ2i ) ∈ Af ∪ {σ2i }, for all σ2i ∈ Ac, and µ (δi) = σ2j if and only if µ
(
σ2j
)
= δi for all(
δi, σ
2
j
) ∈ Af × Ac. An equilibrium is defined by a matching function that specifies
which type of firm employs which type of CEO/manager, and the associated contracts.
A firm is unmatched if µ (δi) = δi. Similarly, a CEO or manager is unmatched if
µ (σ2i ) = σ
2
i .
The first condition for equilibrium is that the matching function is consistent; each
manager or CEO is matched with one firm at most. The second condition is that
no firm can break its match and increase its expected profit by proposing a contract
to an already matched manager or CEO who would prefer that contract. The model
corresponds to a matching model with nontransferabilities, as studied in Legros and
Newman (2007). They derive sufficient conditions on the Pareto frontiers generated by
a match that ensure positive or negative assortative matching.
Proposition 2. Consider a matching µ associated with optimal contracts. This
matching is stable if and only if the n − l firms with the lowest δ’s are matched with
managers, and there is positive assortative matching between the l CEOs and the l firms
with the highest δ’s: µ (δ1) = σ
2
1, µ (δ2) = σ
2
2, ..., µ(δl) = σ
2
l .
For any fixed set of reservation utilities, a match between risky CEOs and firms
with better monitoring capacity generates more surplus. Indeed, it is more likely that
the estimated ability of a more risky CEO (with a higher σ2a) will fall below the firing
threshold of any given firm. To minimize the costs of inefficient continuation of CEOs
with low ability, it is more efficient to match a risky CEO with a firm with a good
monitoring capacity. The firm will exert more monitoring effort and thus will be in a
better position to dismiss a CEO with low ability.
The reservation utilities of CEOs and the wages associated with their optimal con-
tracts are determined in the matching equilibrium. The wage of CEO σl matched with
firm δl is such that if firm δl+1 were to attract this CEO, it would make zero expected
profits, which is what it gets by hiring a manager. This condition pins down the wage
that firm δl needs to give its CEO, and also determines the expected profits of that
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firm. The wage of CEO l− 1 and the expected profits of firm l− 1 are similarly deter-
mined by the condition that firm l cannot hire CEO l − 1 and make higher expected
profits than it would by employing CEO l−1 with the contract previously determined.
The existing evidence, while not conclusive, is at least consistent with the prediction
that more risky CEOs are hired by firms with a greater capacity for monitoring: Shen
and Cannella (2002) and Agrawal, Knoeber, and Tsoulouhas (2006) find a statistically
significant association between hiring an industry outsider as CEO and the proportion
of independent directors.
3.2 Pay-for-luck and monitoring
The matching equilibrium and the associated contracts can explain the Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) finding that firms without a large shareholder use contracts that
display more pay for luck. This empirical fact is at the root of the managerial power
theory that argues that CEOs “set their own pay” in badly governed firms (Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001)), and it has not been explained by any model of efficient
contracting.
The link between pay-for-luck and poor monitoring capacity follows from endoge-
nous matching and not (directly) from differences in monitoring capacity. For example,
two firms with different δ’s but with identical CEOs would offer identical compensa-
tion packages. However, in the stable matching equilibrium, these two different firms
are matched with CEOs of different types that require different contracts. As a con-
sequence, the observed differences in CEO pay across firms with different monitoring
capacities are explained by differences in CEO characteristics. Specifically, in a match-
ing equilibrium, firms with worse monitoring (that is, with less concentrated ownership)
are matched with CEOs with a lower σ2a (“safe CEOs”). But Proposition 1 states that
pay-for-luck is decreasing in σ2a. Therefore, in equilibrium, there is more pay-for-luck
in firms with worse monitoring. The following Proposition summarizes this point:18
Proposition 3. (i) The second period reservation wage is relatively more sensitive to
18The result is not purely driven by our modeling of monitoring. In a previous version of the paper,
this result was obtained in a model where the cost of CEO dismissal varies across firms.
18
luck than to performance for CEOs whose ability is more precisely estimated ex-ante:
dw?2(aˆ, L)
dL
/
dw?2(aˆ, L)
dV
is (weakly) decreasing in σ2a. (19)
(ii) Firms with less concentrated ownership (low δi) offer contracts that display
more pay-for-luck than firms with more concentrated ownership (high δi).
The intuition behind the result is well illustrated by the following extreme example.
Suppose that the ability of a given CEO i is known: σ2i = 0. Since aˆ = a¯ with
probability one, the second period reservation wage of this CEO depends only on future
business conditions, or “luck” (L). Firm performance net of luck is not informative
about the CEO’s ability. On the contrary, for of a CEO j with uncertain ability (σ2j >
0), the second period reservation wage depends both on future business conditions and
on the updated expected ability of the CEO. In the case of CEO i, the variability in
the second period pay of the CEO is fully attributable to luck. In the case of CEO
j, it is attributable both to luck and to the updated CEO’s ability. In a matching
equilibrium, CEO i is hired by the firm with the worst monitoring ability (lowest
δ), and he is exclusively paid for luck, whereas CEO j is paid both for luck and for
performance.
3.3 CEO salaries and monitoring
The model has implications for the distribution of CEO salaries across firms with dif-
ferent monitoring capacities. Since a firm matches the outside option of the CEO in
the second period, the fixed wage w1 fully characterizes the contract. Denoting by w
i
1
the first-period wage of CEO i, the following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium
distribution of salaries across firms.
Proposition 4. The CEO wage w1 is higher in a firm with relatively worse monitor-
ing if and only if the cost of dismissal K or the transferability of skills γ are sufficiently
large:
(i) For any K ∈ (0,∞), there exists γ ∈ (0, 1) with w i+11 > wi1 for γ > γ, and
w i+11 < w
i
1 for γ < γ;
(ii) For any γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists K ∈ (0,∞) with w i+11 > wi1 for K > K, and
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Figure 1: Expected second period profit of a firm as a function of the expected ability
aˆ of its CEO.
w i+11 < w
i
1 for K < K.
There are two forces at play. First, the fact that dismissal is costly (K > 0) implies
that firms might be stuck with a CEO with a low estimated ability aˆ. Intuitively,
costly dismissal (K > 0) introduces some concavity in the second period expected firm
profits as a function of estimated ability aˆ, as depicted in Figure 1 (with K =∞ and
γ < 1, this function would be concave). Second, CEOs capture only a fraction γ of
the gains from their estimated ability at the beginning of the second period, because
of the imperfect transferability of managerial skills across firms (γ < 1). The higher γ,
the less benefits firms reap from having a CEO with superior ability. Intuitively, the
fact that the CEO captures some of the gains from his skills (γ > 0) also introduces
some concavity in the aforementioned function depicted in Figure 1 (with γ = 0, this
function would be convex). The slope of this function is 1 on (−K,w1/γ), and 1 − γ
on (w1/γ,∞).
In sum, an increase in either the dismissal cost (K) or the transferability of manage-
rial skills (γ) increases the relative value of a CEO whose variance of ability is relatively
low. In equilibrium, this type of CEO will be paid a higher salary if K and/or γ is
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sufficiently high. But this type of CEO is matched with a firm with poor monitoring
capacity (low δ). Consequently, for sufficiently high values of K and/or γ, the CEO
salary will be higher in firms with poor monitoring, which can be interpreted as bad
governance.
3.4 Pay-for-performance and monitoring
Another major prediction of the managerial power theory is that the sensitivity of pay
to performance is lower in firms with worse governance, and that the CEOs of these
firms are punished less for bad performances. There is some empirical support for
these predictions. For example, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that the concentration
of institutional investors, which may “result in greater monitoring and scrutiny of the
CEO” (in the words of Bebchuk and Fried (2003)), is positively related to the pay-
performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO compensation. Bell and Van Reenen (2013) also
find that the relation between pay and performance is more asymmetric in firms with a
smaller base of institutional investors, in the sense that these firms’ CEOs are even less
punished for negative performances than they are rewarded for positive performances.
The model can explain this asymmetry, as well as the association between mon-
itoring ability and pay-for-performance. Indeed, under certain conditions, a larger
ownership stake δi is associated with less protection against negative outcomes and a
higher PPS. Denoting by PPSP,i the PPS in firm i at the level of performance P , we
summarize these results in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5. If the cost of dismissal K and the transferability of managerial skills
γ are sufficiently large, then
(i) For any two given levels of performances P and P , with P > P , the ratio
PPSP,i
PPSP,i
(if well-defined) is higher in firms with a larger δi;
(ii) At any given level of the performance measure P , the sensitivity of pay to per-
formance is higher in firms with larger δi.
The intuition behind the first result is the following: to the extent that the fixed
wage w?1 is higher in firms with worse monitoring (cf. Proposition 4), CEOs in these
firms are more protected against the negative consequences of a low first-period perfor-
mance. The intuition for the second result is twofold. First, the first period performance
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of the firm is more informative for a CEO whose ability is less precisely estimated ex-
ante (high σ2i ). The outside option of such a CEO in the second period is therefore
more sensitive to his first period performance, so that the type of firm he is matched
with (a firm with a high δi) must increase the PPS on the upside (ψ) for retention
purposes. Second, with a higher ψ and/or a lower w?1, the outside option of the CEO
in the second period exceeds w?1 for a larger range of performances. CEO pay must
then be sensitive to performance for a larger range of performances.
In summary, the pay of CEOs at firms which better monitoring is sensitive to
performance for a larger set of performances, and it is more sensitive to performance
on that set. The model also predicts that the PPS is positively related to the variability
of firm profits (which is increasing in σ2i ), as in Inderst and Mueller (2010), but contrary
to a standard model of incentive pay (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)).
3.5 Corporate governance spillovers
The matching model generates corporate governance spillovers, whereby an improve-
ment in the monitoring capacity of a subset of firms has spillover effects on CEO
compensation in firms with better monitoring.
Proposition 6. If δi increases for i ∈ {j, . . . , n}, with j ≤ l, without changing the
ranking of firms on that dimension, then CEO compensation increases in the set of
firms with ownership structure {δ1, . . . , δl}.
In equilibrium, firm expected profits are constrained by the competition for CEOs.
The difference in expected profits between any given firm and the next firm with worse
monitoring is increasing in the wedge between the monitoring intensities of the two
firms. An improvement in the monitoring capacity of the worst firms reduces this
wedge and therefore reduces expected profits in this subset of firms (except for firms
that employ managers). This leads to an increase in the compensation of their CEOs.
These firms, in turn, are willing to pay more to hire CEOs employed in firms with
better monitoring. In equilibrium, CEO pay must therefore increase in all firms with
better monitoring. In particular, an improvement in the monitoring capacity of the
worst firms triggers an across-the-board increase in CEO pay. This result can explain
that CEO pay rose as corporate governance improved in the U.S. (see Huson, Parrino,
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and Starks (2001) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2004)), even if this improvement only
concerned firms with bad governance.
By contrast, a firm-specific change in δi does not affect CEO pay in the firm in
question. This is because second-period compensation w?2 is not affected by δi, while
w?1 is only affected by δi to the extent that the reservation utility U¯ of the CEO depends
on δi (the participation constraint is binding in equilibrium). But the reservation utility
of the CEO is unrelated to firm-specific factors; it does not depend on the monitoring
intensity of the firm. Interestingly, a model of managerial power would tend to make
a different prediction. For example, in the model of Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009),
CEOs “receive further compensation for their entrenchment.” Given that changes in
governance are often either correlated with other factors or not firm-specific, the related
empirical evidence is scarce. This said, Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) identify
a firm-specific exogenous shock to governance, and find that the effect on the level of
CEO pay is statistically insignificant – even though the effects on other firm-specific
variables are large. This is in line with the prediction of our model that CEO pay is
unrelated to firm-specific corporate governance.
4 Other predictions and empirical implications
In this section, we confront other predictions of the model to further empirical evidence.
Even though we do not explicitly derive predictions on this dimension, there are
reasons to believe that the uncertainty about CEO ability σ2a decreases over the tenure
of a CEO, as more signals about his ability become available. An implicit prediction
of our model is therefore that pay-for-luck should increase over CEO tenure. Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001) derive a similar prediction with the managerial power theory:
insofar as CEOs with a longer tenure are more entrenched, they can extract more
benefits in the form of asymmetric pay-for-luck.19 This prediction, which is empirically
validated, is thus common to the managerial power theory and the efficient contracting
model.
The model does not generate any cross-sectional prediction regarding the frequency
19Garvey and Milbourn (2003) also find that relative performance evaluation, which consists in
filtering out one type of exogenous shock, namely the market index, is stronger for younger CEOs.
They interpret this finding as evidence that firms tend to let older (and more wealthy) CEOs hedge
against market fluctuations themselves, since they are better able to do so than young CEOs.
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of firm-CEO separations depending on a measure of corporate governance. Firms with
a more limited monitoring capacity hire CEOs with a more precisely estimated ability,
which tends to reduce bad surprises and the associated dismissal. But CEOs with a
more precisely estimated ability may be older, and therefore closer to retirement, which
tends to increase voluntary turnover. A priori, it is not clear which effect dominates.
This is in line with Kaplan and Minton (2012), who find no statistically significant
relation between CEO turnover and corporate governance in the cross-section. On the
contrary, with an across-the-board change in governance, which leaves the ranking of
firms unchanged, there is no sorting effect. Therefore, only the direct effect is present,
and the model predicts that an across-the-board improvement in monitoring capacity
leads to more forced CEO turnover. This is again consistent with the evidence in
Kaplan and Minton (2012), and with the predictions in Hermalin (2005).
According to Frydman (2007) and Frydman and Saks (2010), CEO pay was sta-
ble and pay dispersion across executives was low from the 1930s to the 1970s, but
not in the following decades. The predictions of the model are consistent with these
patterns. Indeed, the evidence in Frydman (2007) suggests that firm-specific skills
predominantly mattered in the past, while general skills have become more important
in the last decades, i.e., γ increased. In our model, with a low γ, CEO skills are not
easily transferable, and CEO pay is largely unresponsive to CEO performance. CEO
pay is therefore relatively stable over time. If in addition there is little dispersion in
the expected ability of CEOs ex-ante (before the performances are realized), then the
dispersion of CEO pay across firms is low – even if the actual dispersion of abilities
across CEOs is large and is at least partly learned ex-interim. This is because the
first period wage w?1 depends on the expected ability a¯, while the second period wage
deviates from this level only to the extent that γ is substantial. On the contrary, the
model predicts that a rise in γ should coincide with a higher PPS and a rise in ex-post
pay dispersion among CEOs.20
20Note that Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2007) relate the increase in the relative
importance of general skills to the level of CEO pay and CEO turnover, whereas our model also relates
it to the structure of CEO compensation and the PPS (which is increasing in γ).
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5 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of efficient contracting that addresses some fundamental
arguments of the managerial power theory. The main contribution is to study the
consequences of endogenous matching between firms with different capacities for mon-
itoring and CEOs with a more or less uncertain ability. The model can explain that
CEOs in firms with worse monitoring (or governance) receive higher salaries, are more
paid for luck, and get a compensation that is less sensitive to performance, especially
on the downside because of a greater asymmetry in the pay-for-performance relation.
We also find that an improvement in the monitoring capacity of the worst firms has
spillover effects that increase CEO pay in all firms, but that a firm-specific change in
monitoring capacity does not affect CEO pay. These results contribute to a large recent
literature which shows that the efficient contracting paradigm can actually explain a
number of apparent anomalies (see Edmans and Gabaix (2009)). In particular, the
ability of the model to explain many important stylized facts suggests that the reten-
tion motive is an important determinant of the structure (not just the level) of CEO
compensation.
The results have obvious policy implications. If the “anomalies” related to CEO
pay imply a corporate governance failure – that would affect a majority of large Amer-
ican firms and have wide ranging consequences, of which the observed anomalies would
merely be a symptom – then it provides the grounds for a regulatory intervention, and
a substantial change in firm governance. However, if this evidence can be comprehen-
sively explained by a simple model of efficient contracting, then it is unclear whether
such measures are necessary.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2:
Recall the optimal effort of the shareholder: M(K, σ2a) =
∫ −K
−∞ (−K − x) ϕˆ(x)dx.
The problem is globally concave, so that the following first-order condition is nec-
essary and sufficient
e? = δiM(K, σ
2
a)/c. (20)
Since M(K, σ2a) > 0, it then follows that e
? is strictly increasing in δi. Finally, our
assumption that c > M(K, σ2a) guarantees that e
? ∈ (0, 1).
To prove that e∗ is increasing in σ2a, we will show that M(K, σ
2
a) is increasing in σ
2
a.
Let σ2i > σ
2
j . Then we have to show that∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx >
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆj(x)dx.
Integrating by parts, we get∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx−
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆj(x)dx
=
∫ −K
−∞
(
Φˆi (x)− Φˆj (x)
)
dx.
Given that an increase in variance of the normal distribution is a mean preserving
spread, we get that Φˆi (x) > Φˆj (x) for x < a¯. Since the mean of both distributions is
a¯ > 0, we have that Φˆi (x)− Φˆj (x) > 0 for x < −K < a¯. The result follows. 
Proof of Lemma 3:
The optimal long-term contract solves the following optimization problem:
min
〈w1,w2(aˆ,L)〉
w1 +
∫ ∫
w2(x, y)dFaˆ (x) dG(y)
w2(aˆ, L) ≥ W2(aˆ, L) for all aˆ, L
u (w1) +
∫ ∫
w2(x, y)dFaˆ (x) dG(y) ≥ U¯ .
30
The first-order conditions with respect to w1 and w2(aˆ, L) are respectively:
1− µu′ (w1) = 0 (21)
1− λ(aˆ, L)/ (faˆ (aˆ) g(L))− µu′(w2(aˆ, L)) = 0 for all aˆ, L, (22)
where λ(aˆ, L) and µ are respectively the (nonnegative) Lagrange multipliers associ-
ated with the constraints (12) and (13), where λ(aˆ, L) ≥ 0 satisfy the complementary
slackness condition:
λ(aˆ, L)(W2(aˆ, L)− w2(aˆ, L)) = 0 for all aˆ, L. (23)
Since the second-order conditions for minimization are satisfied, this immediately yields
the form of the optimal long-term contract described in Lemma 3. The second period
wage is equal to the reservation wage if the reservation wage is larger than the first-
period wage, or it is equal to the first-period wage. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
The comparative static results follow immediately from the performance measure
P and the optimal contract as defined in Lemma 3.
To establish (iii), when aˆ < 0, w∗2 = w
∗
1 and the second period-wage is constant.
For any given value of aˆ > 0, there exists L ≡ w∗1/γaˆ such that dw
?
2
dL
= γaˆ > 0 if L > L
and
dw?2
dL
= 0 if L < L. 
Proof of Proposition 2:
We will use the condition in Proposition 1-ii in Legros and Newman (2007) to prove
that in a stable matching firms with better governance match with riskier CEOs.
Consider two firms with ownership structures δi > δi+1 and two CEOs indexed by
“risk” σ2i > σ
2
i+1. Recall that the choice of monitoring effort for firm δj is characterized
by e? = δjM (K, σ
2
a) /c. Monitoring is all the more valuable that the CEO is more
risky: compared to a firm whose shareholder does not monitor, a firm δj whose share-
holder monitors with effort e∗ makes δ2jM
2 (K, σ2a) /c extra profits, where M (K, σ
2
a) is
increasing in σ2a (cf. Lemma 2). This means that the match {(δi, σ2i ) , (δi+1, σ2i+1)} is
more efficient than the other match.
Consider now the long-term contracts offered by the firm δi+1 to both types of CEOs
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that lead to the same expected profit for the firm. To prove the matching configuration,
we just need to show that if the firm δi designs long-term optimal contracts for the
CEOs such that CEOs are indifferent between the contracts offered by the two firms,
it would make larger expected profits by hiring the more risky CEO.
To start with, note that the expected utility of a CEO for a given long-term contract
depends only on w∗1. This means that the firm δi would propose the same long-term
contract as the firm δi+1 if it needs to provide the same expected utility to the CEO.
Since M (K, σ2a) increases in σ
2
a, the firm δi would make more profits by contracting
with the riskier CEO. 
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) Either W2 < w
∗
1, in which case
dw2
dL
= 0 and dw2
dV
= 0, so that
dw2
dL
dw2
dV
is independent
of σ2a. Or W2 ≥ w∗1, in which case dw2dL = ψη and dw2dV = ψ, so that
dw2
dL
dw2
dV
= η, which is
positive and decreasing in σ2a (as shown in Proposition 1).
(ii) follows directly from assortative matching and (i). 
Proof of Proposition 4:
The ranking of firms is such that δ1 > δ2 > · · · > δl > · · · > δn, and the ranking of
CEOs is such that σ1 > σ2 > · · · > σl. According to Proposition 2, firm l is matched
with CEO l, firm l− i is matched with CEO l− i, and firm 1 is matched with CEO 1.
Consider firm l. The contract it is offering its CEO is designed to make firm l + 1
indifferent between attracting CEO l and hiring a manager, that is, to ensure that firm
l+1 would make negative expected profits by giving a better offer to CEO l. Similarly,
the contract of CEO l − 1 offered by firm l − 1 is designed so that firm l makes the
same expected profit with the optimal contract it offers CEO l and the expected profit
it would make by attracting CEO l − 1.
That is, for any i ∈ (1, . . . , l−1), the CEO contracts are determined so that firm i+1
is indifferent between hiring CEO i or CEO i+1. In addition, since the contract is fully
determined by the wage w1, the wages of CEO i and CEO i+ 1, denoted respectively
by wi1 and w
i+1
1 , are determined so that firm i + 1 is indifferent between hiring CEO
i or CEO i + 1. So assume for now that wi1 = w
i+1
1 ≡ w1. Then the profit of firm
i+ 1 must be higher when it employs CEO i+ 1, otherwise the matching equilibrium
is not stable. We now find conditions under which the profit is higher when firm i+ 1
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employs CEO i with wi1 = w
i+1
1 , so that to restore the matching equilibrium it has to
be that wi1 > w
i+1
1 . Similarly, when the profit is higher when firm i + 1 employs CEO
i+ 1, the opposite condition on wages obtains.
Remember that ϕˆi denotes the p.d.f. of aˆ for a CEO of type σi. We also call a
∗
the updated ability such that w1 = γa
∗. It represents the lowest updated ability for
which the participation constraint is binding. The ex-ante profit of the firm is piecewise
linear, but the slope changes at aˆ = −K and at aˆ = a∗ (as depicted in Figure 1).
The profit of firm i + 1 over both periods when it employs CEO i at wage wi1 and
the monitoring intensity is e∗ is
Π (δi+1, σi) = α+γa¯−w1+
∫ a∗
−K
[α− w1 + x] ϕˆi(x)dx+
∫ ∞
a∗
[α− w1 + γa∗ + (1− γ)x] ϕˆi(x)dx
+e∗ (δi+1, σi)
∫ −K
−∞
[α− w1 −K] ϕˆi(x)dx+ (1− e∗ (δi+1, σi))
∫ −K
−∞
[α− w1 + x] ϕˆi(x)dx
The profit of firm i+ 1 over both periods when it employs CEO i+ 1 at wage wi1 is:
Π (δi+1, σi+1) = α+γa¯−w1+
∫ a∗
−K
[α− w1 + x] ϕˆi+1(x)dx+
∫ ∞
a∗
[α− w1 + γa∗ + (1− γ)x] ϕˆi+1(x)dx
+e∗ (δi+1, σi)
∫ −K
−∞
[α− w1 −K] ϕˆi+1(x)dx+(1− e∗ (δi+1, σi+1))
∫ −K
−∞
[α− w1 + x] ϕˆi+1(x)dx
We want to show that Π (δi+1, σi) < Π (δi+1, σi+1) when γ > γ(K), or K > K (γ).
We have
Π (δi+1, σi)− Π (δi+1, σi+1) =
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x) (e∗ (δi+1, σi) ϕˆi(x)− e∗ (δi+1, σi+1) ϕˆi+1(x)) dx
+
∫ a∗
−∞
x
(
ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx+ ∫ ∞
a∗
[(1− γ)x+ γa∗] (ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx
We first prove the following intermediate result:∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx >
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi+1(x)dx.
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Integrating by parts, we get∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx−
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi+1(x)dx
=
∫ −K
−∞
(
Φˆi (x)− Φˆi+1 (x)
)
dx.
Given that an increase in variance of the normal distribution is a mean preserving
spread, we get that Φˆi (x) > Φˆi+1 (x) for x < a¯. Since a¯ > 0, we have that Φˆi (x) −
Φˆi+1 (x) > 0 for x < −K < a¯. The result follows.
First, assume that K =∞. We have that
Π (δi+1, σi)−Π (δi+1, σi+1) =
∫ a∗
−∞
x
(
ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx+∫ ∞
a∗
[(1−γ)x+γa∗] (ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx.
We are just comparing the expected values under the two distributions of a function
that is equal to x for x < a∗ and equal to (1 − γ)x + γa∗ for x > a∗. This function
is piecewise linear and concave. Since ϕi is a mean-preserving spread of ϕi+1, second-
order stochastic dominance gives the result that Π (δi+1, σi)− Π (δi+1, σi+1) < 0. This
implies that wi+11 > w
i
1 when K =∞.
Second, assume that K = 0. Then
Π (δi+1, σi)− Π (δi+1, σi+1) =
∫ 0
−∞
x((1− e∗ (δi+1, σi+1)) ϕˆi(x)− (1− e∗ (δi+1, σi+1)) ϕˆi+1(x)dx
+
∫ w1/γ
0
x
(
ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx+ ∫ ∞
w1/γ
[(1− γ)x+ w1]
(
ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx.
¿From Lemma 2, e∗ (δi+1, σi) > e∗ (δi+1, σi+1), so that we have∫ 0
−∞
xe∗ (δi+1, σi)ϕi+1(x)dx >
∫ 0
−∞
xe∗ (δi+1, σi+1)ϕi+1(x)dx
and limγ→0
∫∞
w1/γ
[(1− γ)x+ w1](ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x))dx = 0. Thus,
lim
γ→0
Π (δi+1, σi)− Π (δi+1, σi+1)
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>∫ 0
−∞
x ((1− e∗(δi+1, σi+1))
(
ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx+ ∫ ∞
0
x
(
ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx
We are now comparing the expected values under the two distributions of a function
that is equal to x(1− e∗ (δi+1, σi+1)) for x < 0 and equal to x for x > 0. This function
is piecewise linear and convex. Second-order stochastic dominance gives the result that
Π (δi+1, σi) − Π (δi+1, σi+1) > 0 when K = 0 and γ → 0, in which case we must have
wi+11 < w
i
1.
Third, we now show that Π (δi+1, σi) − Π (δi+1, σi+1) is decreasing in γ and in K,
which completes the proof. We have:
d
dγ
{Π (δi+1, σi)− Π (δi+1, σi+1)} =
∫ ∞
w1/γ
∂
∂γ
{
[(1− γ)x+ w1]
(
ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x))} dx
= −
∫ ∞
a∗
x
(
ϕˆi(x)− ϕˆi+1(x)) dx < 0.
The first equality follows from the fact that the terms coming from differentiating with
respect to γ in the bounds of the integrals cancel out. This shows that Π (δi+1, σi) −
Π (δi+1, σi+1) is decreasing in γ.
We also have that:
d
dK
{Π (δi+1, σi)− Π (δi+1, σi+1)} =
∫ −K
−∞
− (e∗ (δi+1, σi) ϕˆi(x)− e∗ (δi+1, σi+1) ϕˆi+1(x)) dx
+
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)
(
d
dK
e∗ (δi+1, σi) ϕˆ
i(x)− d
dK
e∗ (δi+1, σi+1) ϕˆ
i+1(x)
)
dx
Recall from Lemma 2 that:
e∗ (δi+1, σi) =
δi+1
c
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx,
so that
d
dK
e∗ (δi+1, σi) = −δi+1
c
Φˆi(−K).
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Substituting, we get
d
dK
{Π (δi+1, σi)− Π (δi+1, σi+1)}
= −e∗ (δi+1, σi) Φˆi(−K) + e∗ (δi+1, σi+1) Φˆi+1(−K)
−δi+1
c
Φˆi(−K)
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx+ δi+1
c
Φˆi+1(−K)
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi+1(x)dx
= −2δi+1
c
(
Φˆi(−K)
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx− Φˆi+1(−K)
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi+1(x)dx
)
.
Since −K < a¯, we have
Φˆi(−K) > Φˆi+1(−K),
Moreover, as proved in Lemma 2,∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx >
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi+1(x)dx,
So that
Φˆi(−K)
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi(x)dx− Φˆi+1(−K)
∫ −K
−∞
(−K − x)ϕˆi+1(x)dx > 0
Thus,
d
dK
{Π (δi+1, σi)− Π (δi+1, σi+1)} < 0.

Proof of Proposition 5:
We begin by proving result (ii). For any given firm, the PPS at P is either equal to
zero or to ψ, and it is equal to zero if and only if P < κ, where κ =
w∗1(1−ψ)
ψ
(as derived
in section 2.3). To prove result (ii), we show that ψ is increasing in δi, and that κ is
decreasing in δi for sufficiently high K and γ.
First, (17) shows that ψ is increasing in σ2i , and from Proposition 2 proves that
CEOs with a high σ2i are matched with firms with a high δi, so that ψ is increasing in
δi. Second, for any given firm, κ is decreasing in ψ and increasing in w
?
1. In addition,
for sufficiently high K and γ, Proposition 4 states that w?1 is lower at firms with a
higher δi. Since ψ is increasing in δi, it follows that, for sufficiently high K and γ, κ is
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decreasing in δi.
We now prove result (i). If for any δi we have PPSP ,i = 0, then the ratio
PPSP,i
PPSP,i
is
not well-defined. Given the form of the contract, for a given firm i the ratio is well-
defined if and only if P > κi. For a well-defined ratio, for any given firm i there are
two intervals. For P < κ, the ratio is equal to zero. For P > κ, the ratio is equal to
one. Result (i) then follows from the fact that κ is decreasing in δi. 
Proof of Proposition 6:
The ranking of firms is δ1 > δ2 > · · · > δl > · · · > δn and the ranking of CEOs is
σ1 > σ2 > · · · > σl.
According to Proposition 2, firm l is matched with CEO l, firm l − 1 is matched
with CEO l − 1, and firm 1 is matched with CEO 1. We consider an increase in δi for
firms i ∈ {j, n}, which does not affect the ordering of firms and leaves the matching
unchanged.
Consider firm l. Before the changes in monitoring capacity, the contract it was
offering to its CEO was designed to make firm l + 1 indifferent between attracting
CEO l and hiring a manager, that is, to ensure that firm l + 1 would make negative
expected profits by giving a better offer to CEO l. Similarly, the contract of CEO
l − 1 offered by firm l − 1 was designed so that firm l makes the same expected profit
with the optimal contract it offers CEO l and the expected profit it would make by
attracting CEO l − 1.
For any given i, when δi increases, the monitoring of firm i changes independently
of the contracts, which leads to an increase in the expected profits of firm i.
The indifference condition that determines the wage wl is:
Π
(
δl+1, σl, w
l
1
)
= Π
(
δl+1, 0, w
l+1
1
)
where Π
(
δl, σl, w
l
1
)
corresponds to the profit of firm δl+1 that employs CEO σl and
Π
(
δl+1, 0, w
l+1
1
)
the profit of firm δl+1 that employs a manager. We have
Π
(
δl+1, σl, w
l
1
)
=
(
α + γa¯− wl1
)
+
∫ wl1/γ
−K
[
α− wi1 + x
]
ϕˆl(x)dx
+
∫ ∞
wl1/γ
[
α− wl1 + γa∗ + (1− γ)x
]
ϕˆl(x)dx
37
+e∗ (δl + 1, σl)
∫ −K
−∞
[
α− wl1 −K
]
ϕˆl(x)dx+(1− e∗ (δl+1, σl))
∫ −K
−∞
[
α− wl1 + x
]
ϕˆl(x)dx
and Π
(
δl+1, 0, w
l+1
1
)
does not depend on δl+1 since managers are not monitored. The
profits Π
(
δl+1, σl, w
l
1
)
are increasing in δl+1. To restore the indifference condition, there
must be an increase in wl1.
Now consider CEO σl−1. His wage wl−11 is determined by the indifference condition:
Π
(
δl, σl, w
l
1
)
= Π
(
δl, σl−1, wl−11
)
.
A higher δl increases the expected profits firm l relatively more when it employs a
riskier CEO, and wl has increased to react to the competition of firm l+ 1. These two
facts make it more attractive for firm l to compete for CEO l − 1 relative to CEO l.
In response, to maintain assortative matching, firm l − 1 needs to adjust the contract
it offers to CEO l − 1 by increasing his first-period wage so that firm l is indifferent
between hiring CEO l or CEO l− 1. By induction, this process leads to an increase in
the wage of all CEOs. 
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